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A. Nature of Case
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action comes before this Court for judicial review of a decision of the Idaho
Industrial Commission ("Commission"), which upheld a previous decision by 
Respondent Idaho Department of Labor (hereinafter "IDOL"). The decision which 
Claimant/Appellant Carla Sparks (hereinafter "Sparks") is challenging was initially 
issued by an IDOL appeals examiner and involved a challenge to benefits being 
sought by Sparks following her dismissal by her former employer, Laura Drake 
Insurance and Financial Services, Inc. (hereinafter "Drake"). 
B. Course of Proceedings
IDOL issued a Personal Eligibility Determination finding Sparks eligible to
receive unemployment insurance benefits and a Chargeability Determination 
identifying Drake as the chargeable employer on March 31, 2017. (Tr. p. 9, 1. 19 
through p.10, 1. 2; Exhibit to Record pp. 11-16). On April 3, 2017, Drake appealed the 
Personal Eligibility Determination asserting that Sparks was terminated for cause. 
(Exhibit to Record pp. 18-28). 
The administrative appeal was assigned by IDOL to appeals examiner Paul 
Kime, who set the matter for hearing by telephone conference on April 26, 2017. (Tr. 
p. 4, 11. 7-21; Exhibit to Record pp. 1-3). At the time, set for the hearing Drake
appeared and participated but Sparks did not. (Tr. p. 4, 11. 7-17; R. p. 1). The Decision 
of Appeals Examiner was issued by Mr. Kime on April 27, 2017, reversed the initial 
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Personal Eligibility Determination and found that Sparks was discharged for cause. 
(R. pp. 1-7). 
On April 28, 2017, Sparks filed a request to reopen the hearing claiming that 
she had not received the notice of hearing until after the hearing date because she 
did not make an effort to obtain the package from the post office until after the 
hearing had taken place. (R. p. 15). Mr. Kime considered Sparks' request with the 
reason presented and concluded the explanation provided by Sparks for not 
appearing at the hearing was insufficient to justify reopening the hearing. (R. pp. 8-
9). 
On May 5, 2017 Sparks filed an appeal with the Idaho Industrial Commission 
(hereinafter "the Commission") which once again sought to reopen the evidentiary 
proceedings. (R. pp. 13-14). The Commission issued its Decision and Order on June 
5, 2017. In that Decision and Order, the Commission considered Sparks' request to 
reopen the evidentiary proceedings and found that she had not provided a compelling 
reason to allow an additional hearing and specifically found Sparks' own negligence 
in failing to retrieve the Notice of Hearing, which had been properly served upon her, 
was insufficient to justify her failure to appear or_ warrant a new hearing. (R. p. 37). 
The Commission also conducted a de novo review of the substantive decision made by 
the appeals examiner and determined that based upon the evidence in the record, 
that Drake discharged Sparks for employment-related misconduct, and as such 
Sparks was ineligible for unemployment benefits. (R. pp. 38-41). 
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On June 16, 2017, Sparks wrote to the Commission again requesting to reopen 
the evidentiary proceedings. (R. pp. 44-46.) The Commission considered that 
correspondence as a request for reconsideration of the June 5, 2017 Decision and 
Order. (R. p. 47). The Commission extensively outlined the reasoning for its decision 
not to reopen the evidentiary record and affirmed the decision of the appeals 
examiner in an Order Denying Reconsideration issued August 29, .2017. (R. pp. 47-
51). 
On September 26, 2017, Sparks filed her appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
(R. p. 53). 
C. Statement of Facts
The operative facts are set out in the Findings of Fact in the Decision of Appeals
Examiner and are adopted in full as follows: 
1. Claimant [Sparks] began working for employer [Drake] on April 1, 2015.
Her last day of work was February 22, 2017. Claimant worked full time
for employer as a Property Casualty Customer Service Representative.
2. In about the last three months before claimant's discharge, employer had
been experiencing increasing difficulties with claimant's performance.
Claimant was not getting policy renewals done timely, she was not
submitting reports timely, and there were interpersonal problems
between claimant and a coworker.
3. Employer had weekly meetings with claimant, and reviewed claimant's
work with her each week. Employer pointed out the problems in
claimant's work, but never explicitly told her that she could be discharged
if she did not improve.
4. Claimant's performance continued to lag. About two weeks before
claimant's discharge, employer instructed claimant to prepare a policy
renewal proposal for employer's largest client. Employer instructed
claimant to complete the proposal while employer was on vacation. While
on vacation, employer tried to phone in to speak to claimant in the middle
of the vacation, and claimant refused to speak to her.
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(R. p. 2). 
5. Upon her return, employer found that the proposal had not been finished.
Employer was required to finish it herself.
6. The final straw for employer came when claimant mistakenly issued and
exchanged a short-term policy for a long term policy for a client. Claimant
had known of the mistake for several weeks and had taken no action to
remedy the error.
7. Employer reviewed claimant's conduct, and finally decided that she was
too large a liability, and discharged her.
8. In the first four of the five calendar quarters preceding the one in which
the claimant applied for benefits, this employer paid the claimant more
wages than any other employer.
No contradictory facts have been established anywhere in the record. 
RESTATED ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1) Can Sparks rely upon her unsworn, uncorroborated statements as a means to
impeach the hearing record on appeal?
2) Has Sparks shown that the Commission abused its discretion in its decision
not to conduct an additional hearing?
3) Has Sparks shown that the Commission's decision 1s not supported by
substantial and competent evidence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A determination by the Commission on whether or not to take additional 
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Simpson v. Trinity Mission Health &
Rehab of Midland L.P., 150 Idaho 154, 156, 244 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2010).
In appeals from the Commission, the Idaho Supreme Court's jurisdiction on 
substantive issues is limited "to questions of law." Idaho Const., Art. V, § 9. This 
Court has observed that is "constitutionally compelled to defer to the Commission's 
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findings of fact where supported by substantial and competent evidence." Lo cker v. 
How Soel, Inc., 151 Idaho 696, 699, 263 P.3d 750, 753 (2011), (Citing Te/fer v. T win 
Fal ls School D ist. N o. 411, 102 Idaho 439, 439, 631 P.2d 610, 610 (1981)). 
Commission findings must be upheld if based on "substantial competent 
evidence," which is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support 
a conclusion. Bringman v. New Albertsons, Inc., 157 Idaho 71, 74, 334 P.3d 262, 265 
(2014); Bel l  v. Idaho Dept. of Labor, 157 Idaho 744, 747, 339 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2014). 
This Court "does not re-weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have 
reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented." Hughen v. Hi ghland 
Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002) In addition, all facts and 
inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before 
the Commission, and its determinations as to credibility of witnesses and weight of 
evidence will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Neihart v Universal Joint Auto 
Parts, Inc., 141 Idaho 801, 802-03, 118 P.3d 133, 134-35 (2005). 
This Court exercises free review over any questions of law decided by the 
Commission. M cNul ty v. Sinclair Oil Corporat ion, 152 Idaho 582, 585, 272 P .3d 554. 
557 (2012). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Ms. Spark s is p rohib i ted from relying upon the non­
ev ident iary statements subm i t ted t o  th is Court in the
Statement of Fac ts of her b rief.
Ms. Sparks' Appel lant's Brief consists almost entirely of a Statement of Facts 
which she wishes this Court to accept at face value. In actuality, that Statement of 
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Facts is nothing more than an attempt to impeach the testimony and evidence 
presented at the hearing held in this case. While it does include citations to the record 
those citations do not represent facts on which Sparks is attempting to rely, but 
rather testimony which Sparks is disputing followed by her own undocumented and 
unsworn statements contradicting the evidence offered at the hearing. This Court is 
prohibited from considering these non-evidentiary statements and must disregard 
any argument based upon those assertions. 
Idaho case law has long held that m appellate proceedings, it is the 
responsibility of the appellant to establish and ensure that the record on appeal 
contains all items necessary to establish the appellant's right to the relief sought 
through the appeal. Van Velson Corp. v. Westwood Mall Ass'n, 126 Idaho 401, 406, 
884 P.2d 414 (1994). This position correlates with one of the most important maxims 
of judicial review, that an appellate court will not consider issues presented for the 
first time on appeal. See, Viveros v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 126 Idaho 714, 
716, 889 P.2d 1104 (1995). 
In the instant case, Sparks failed to appear at the hearing and has been trying 
ever since to impeach the evidence presented at the hearing. It was Sparks' obligation 
to insure that the record contained the facts and evidence to support a showing of 
error on appeal. Unfortunately, she failed to appear and offer testimony at the proper 
time and place. As a result the record on appeal is devoid of all the evidence on which 
she wants to rely. At this point, Sparks is arguing that the appeals examiner erred 
by not considering evidence, which the appeals examiner was never given the 
6 
opportunity to review. Any error on this issue is an invited error which Sparks is 
estopped from asserting. 
Idaho law is well established that "one may not successfully complain of 
errors one has consented to or acquiesced in. In other words, invited errors 
are not reversible." State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 
(1985). "The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting 
an error when his own conduct induces the commission of the error." State 
v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct.App.1993) (citation
omitted)
Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 106-07, 205 P.3d 1235, 1242-43 (2009). 
The brief filed by Ms. Sparks is little more than a recitation of the testimony 
she would presumably have offered had either the appeals examiner or the 
Commission determined that the interest of justice required that additional evidence 
be taken in this matter. However, given that evidence was never reopened and none 
of the alleged "facts" are contained in the record, it is inappropriate for Sparks to cite 
to them throughout her brief. This Court should not consider any alleged assertion 
that "fraud occurred at the Hearing" or consider any of the unsworn statements that 
Sparks is attempting to insert into this appeal. This is the only appropriate manner 
of handling these statements since they are not supported by the record, and in fact 
directly contradict the record on many points. 
Based upon controlling law from this Court, arguments that are not supported 
by citations to either facts in the record or legal authority are deemed waived. 
However, we find that the constitutional arguments contained in 
Wheeler's briefs are both incoherent and unsupported by authority. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35, which governs the content of briefs on appeal, 
requires that "[t]he argument . . .  contain the contentions of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, 
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with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and 
record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6) (emphasis added). Furthermore, this 
Court has held that issues on appeal that are not supported by 
propositions of law or authority are deemed waived and will not be 
considered. 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 266, 207 P.3d 988, 997 
(2009) (internal citation omitted). 
These rules apply equally to all parties, whether represented by counsel or 
appearing pro se. LeBow v. Commercial Tire, Inc., 157 Idaho 379, 384, 336 P.3d 786, 
791 (2014). This is naturally the case where this Court has consistently held that 
individuals representing themselves are held to the same standards as those 
represented by attorneys. "Pro se civil litigants are not accorded special latitude 
merely because they chose to proceed through litigation without the assistance of an 
attorney." Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009). 
We note initially that while Loomis appeared at the summary judgment 
hearing pro se, he may not request special consideration on that basis. 
"Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those 
represented by an attorney." Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 
1086, 1089, n. 5, 739 P.2d 385, 388, n. 5 (1987); State v. Sima, 98 Idaho 
643, 570 P.2d 1333 (1977). 
Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990). 
Sparks' argument that fraud occurred at the hearing, is not supported by any 
citations to facts in the record, nor any legal authority. As such, that argument has 
been waived and must not be considered by this Court. This Court should ignore the 
unsworn allegations present by Sparks and decide this case on the appropriate 
appellate record. 
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II. The Commission app rop riately exer cised its sound
dis c retion in refusing to reopen the evidence when the only
reason Sparks has given for failing to attend the hearing
is her own negligence.
Ms. Sparks' brief is completely devoid of any points of law on which she is 
attempting to rely in challenging the Commission's decision. As previously stated, 
any potential issue arguably raised in the brief should be considered waived due to 
the fact that her brief fails to meet the requirements ofI.A.R. 35(a)(6). Sparks' failure 
to identify discrete allegations of error by the Commission creates a significant 
hardship for IDOL in its attempts to respond to her brief. IDOL must largely guess 
what issues and points to defend as opposed to being able to respond to discreet 
identified points of fact and law. 
Based upon the assertion offraudjustifying a new hearing, IDOL assumes that 
Sparks is arguing the Commission erred in denying her repeated requests to reopen 
the hearing for her to present additional evidence. However as stated above, 
Whether the interests of justice require the admission of additional 
evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the Industrial 
Commission. Slaven v. Road to Recovery, 143 Idaho 483, 484, 148 P.3d 
1229, 1230 (2006). This Court will affirm the Commission's 
determinations unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Uhl v. 
Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). 
The test is "(1) whether the Commission correctly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it, and (3) whether it reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason." Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Commerce and 
Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390, 162 P.3d 765, 769 (2007) . 
. Simpson v. Trinity Mission Health & Rehab of Midland L.P., 150 Idaho 154, 156, 244 
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P.3d 1240, 1242 (2010).
Sparks has not even attempted to demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the 
Commission in its decision not to take additional evidence in this matter. On the 
contrary the Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration is a textbook example of a 
quasi-judicial body demonstrating the proper exercise of discretion in ruling that the 
interest of justice did not require the taking of additional evidence. (R. pp. 4 7-50). 
The Commission clearly identified that it understood it had discretion in 
deciding whether the interests of justice required the presentation of additional 
evidence. (R. p.49, paragraph 1). Furthermore, the Order Denying Reconsideration 
does an excellent job of discussing the analysis used by the Commission in deciding 
not to reopen the evidentiary record in this case. That analysis demonstrated the 
Commission was acting within the boundaries of its discretion, consistent with 
appropriate legal standards, and reached its decision through the exercise of reason. 
Sparks has not provided any argument or legal analysis explaining why she 
believes the Commission abused its discretion when it decided this case on the record 
set at the hearing, as opposed to reopening the record for her to present additional 
evidence. On the other hand the comprehensive set of orders issued by the 
Commission demonstrate a clear understanding and appropriate exercise of the 
discretion it held to decide this issue. There was no abuse of discretion by the 
Commission and this Court should affirm the Commission's ruling not to reopen the 
evidentiary record from the hearing. 
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III. Substantial and competent evidence supports the
Commission's finding that Sparks demonstrate d a
disregard for the standard of be havior that Drake
re asonably expe cte d from Sparks .
The Commission found that Sparks was discharged for misconduct in 
connection with her employment. The personal eligibility conditions for 
unemployment benefits under the Idaho Employment Security Law provide, inter 
alia, that a claimant who "was discharged for misconduct in connection with his 
employment" is not eligible for benefits. Idaho Code § 72-1366(5); IDAPA 
09.01.30.275. 
Misconduct cases focus not on whether the employer had reasonable grounds 
for discharge, but rather on whether the facts resulting in the discharge constitute 
misconduct under Idaho Code§ 72-1366(5) and IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02. See ,  
Adams v. Aspen Water, Inc., 150 Idaho 408, 413, 247 P.3d 635, 640 (2011). 
The employer has the burden of proving an employee's discharge was for 
misconduct in connection with employment. Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 
640; IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01. IDOL's administrative rules describe three separate, 
though sometimes overlapping, grounds that may establish misconduct: 
02. Disqualifying Misconduct. Misconduct that disqualifies a
claimant for benefits must be connected with the claimant's employment
and involve one of the following:
a. Disregard of Employer's Interest. A willful, intentional
disregard of the employer's interest.
b. Violation of Reasonable Rules. A deliberate violation of the
employer's reasonable rules.
c. Disregard of Standards of Behavior. If the alleged
11 
misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior which 
the employer has a right to expect of his employees, there is no 
requirement that the claimant's conduct be willful, intentional, or 
deliberate. The claimant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant. 
The test for misconduct in "standard of behavior cases" 1s as 
follows: 
1. Whether the claimant's conduct fell below the
standard of behavior expected by the employer; and
ii. Whether the employer's expectation was objectively
reasonable in the particular case.
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02. This three-pronged approach follows well-established Idaho 
case law. E.g., Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 
(1957); Jenkins v. Agri-Lines Corp., 11 Idaho 549, 602 P.2d 47 (1979). The
Commission must consider all three potential factual bases for misconduct -­
disregard of employer's interest, violation of reasonable rules, and disregard of 
standards of behavior. Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640. 
The Commission found that Sparks was dismissed for misconduct in that she 
had disregarded "standards of behavior" relating to her employment, which is the 
third prong of misconduct. As a general rule, it need not be shown that an employee's 
disregard of a standard of behavior was willful, intentional, or deliberate. Adams, 
150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640. 
The "standards of behavior" prong involves two inquiries: (1) whether the 
employee's conduct fell below a standard of behavior the employer had a right to 
expect; and (2) whether the employer's expectations were objectively reasonable 
under the circumstances. Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 837, 
933 P.2d 642, 646 (1997). 
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The first inquiry focuses on the employer's subjective expectations, while the 
latter inquires as to whether those expectations are objectively reasonable. An 
expectation is objectively reasonable if it was communicated to the employee, or if it 
"flows naturally" from the employment relationship. "Whether the employer's 
expectations were objectively reasonable is a question of fact." Folks v. Moscow Sch. 
Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 838, 933 P .2d 642, 64 7 (1997). 
Substantial competent evidence supports the finding that Drake 
communicated its expectations to Sparks. The Commission highlighted that the 
testimony of Laura Drake established the employer's reasonable expectations that 
Sparks, "would make every effort to perform · her job duties in a timely and 
conscientious manner." Drake also testified that this expectation was expressed to 
Sparks in a verbal warning and in weekly performance meetings. Finally, the 
Commission concluded that despite the fact Sparks, "should have realized that she 
needed to make every effort to complete her work in a timely and conscientious 
manner and that failure to do so could lead to her discharge," Sparks failed to do so. 
(R. p.41). 
In Locker v. How Soel, Inc., 151 Idaho 696, 263 P.3d 750 (2011), this Court 
reviewed a finding by the Commission that an employee's failure to obtain a medical 
release as requested by her employer was insubordination. The facts showed that 
the employee made a single half-hearted attempt to get a release and then, without 
explanation, did nothing more. The Court, after emphasizing it was "constitutionally 
constrained" from finding its own facts as employee urged on appeal, held: 
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We are unable to conclude, as a matter of law, that an employee has not 
willfully and deliberately disregarded the employer's order when the 
employee has both failed to comply with her employer's order and also 
failed to communicate any justification for her lack of compliance. 
Locker, 151 Idaho at 700, 263 P.3d at 754. 
The same analysis applies to the case at bar. This is particularly the case 
where Sparks, through her own negligence, failed to participate in the hearing. The 
undisputed testimony from Drake controls on appeal, since facts and the inferences 
from those facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed before 
the Commission. Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 154 Idaho 88, 94, 294 P.3d 1100, 1106 
(2013). 
In making her argument Sparks appears to be urging this Court to re-weigh 
the evidence, as well as her additional statements, and make independent findings of 
fact unconstrained by the record and based upon its own judgment. Such a request 
is directly contradictory to the Idaho Constitution, applicable case law and the 
established standard of review. Furthermore Sparks does not even discuss any legal 
support for her position rather just stating a number of conclusory statements. 
When analyzed in accordance with appropriate legal standards and through 
the lens of the standard of review it is clear that the Commission's decision is based 
upon substantial and competent evidence in the record. This Court should affirm the 
Commission's decision in all respects. 
CONCLUSION 
Sparks has failed to list any germane legal issues or present any legal 
argument on appeal. Her brief further disregards and serves only to attack the record 
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on appeal and her fourth request to reopen the evidence in this case should be denied. 
The commission properly exercised its sound discretion when it chose to take this 
matter solely on the record established at the hearing. Substantial and competent 
evidence supports the factual findings of the Commission. The Commission's findings 
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